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Abstract 
The following essay will show that dealing with the Hungarian refugees unmasks the 
popular stereotypes of the response to the uprising of 1956 as a myth of Austrian national 
scholarship. There was neither the unrestricted willingness of Austrians nor the boundless 
gratitude of the Hungarian refugees. The initial sympathies were soon followed by 
disillusionment and disappointment. Austrians as well as Hungarians were confronted 
with a reality in which the Austrian cliché of the Hungarian freedom fighter was no more 
appropriate than the ideas of the Hungarians about the Golden West. 
 
Keywords: Austria, neutrality, 1956, Hungary, refugees 
 
 
Introduction 
When the Austrian federal government committed itself in 1955, with the signing of the 
state treaty (Staatsvertrag) to permanent neutrality, no one in Vienna suspected that a 
year later the Republic would be subjected to a first test on that issue. The evaluation of 
the measures of 1956 is in any case very positive in Austrian historiography. The general 
assessment of the dramatic events of 1956 is one of a passed maturity test from the 
perspective of Austrian neutrality policy. Although many other legends have long since 
dissolved, the year 1956 stands for the tradition of Austrian refugee and asylum policy. 
The solidarity of Austria with the Hungarian refugees is described as a powerful stream 
of aid, the victory of humanity, and a great recognition in modern Austrian history. But 
what contributed to the creation of this myth?  
                                                          
1 After studying German philology and history at Karl Franzens University of Graz, Dr. Peter Wassertheurer 
is currently German lecturer at Sophia University in Japan. He is Scientific Director of the Felix Ermacora 
Institut, and Lecturer at the Institute for Economic Communication at the Vienna University of Economics 
and Business. 
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The Republic of Austria was still at the beginning of a process to find its national 
identity. There was an effort to show this neutrality as a pillar of state sovereignty, and to 
fill it with content. The policy after 1945 was about a clear image correction. With the 
elimination of the responsibility for the Nazi atrocities, the days of the Donau-Monarchy, 
which had been created together with the Hungarian cousin, was looked back on with 
pride. In 1945, the Austrian cultural enterprise explained the history before 1914 as „the 
good old times.” The rebellion of 1956 became part of a new Austrian identity. 
Since the end of the war, Austria had developed into a parliamentary democracy 
and, with the help of the Marshall Plan, developed an increasingly prosperous economy. 
The foundations for this success were the relaxation policy initiated by Foreign Minister 
Karl Gruber against the Communist neighbors of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and 
Hungary as well as the high degree of domestic political stability. Furthermore, the 
success of the Second Republic of Austria was made possible by an equalization policy, 
supported by the then two large parties of the ÖVP (Conservatives) and the SPÖ (Social 
Democrats). In spite of ideological differences in the joint governments since 1945, the 
common national interests have been realized at the level of a consensus-oriented social 
partnership.  
In the meantime, the example of Swiss neutrality obligated Austria to rebuild 
military structures in order to defend the frontiers, if necessary, by military force. Since 
1952, security policy tasks such as the border guards had been fulfilled only by a Police 
Department (B-Gendarmerie), which was subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior. It 
formed the first contingent for the Austrian army (Bundesheer) in July 1955 with a 
strength of 6,000 men. Only two weeks before the start of the escalation of events in 
Budapest, the first 12,000 Austrian soldiers had been drafted. 
 
Beginning of the insurrection and consequences in Austria 
On October 23, 1956, supporters of the Hungarian reform movement (Petőfi Circle) took 
to the street in peaceful demonstrations for more democracy, free elections, the freedom 
of speech and the press, as well as for improving living conditions. The conflict began to 
escalate when the Hungarian government asked Moscow for military support. The 
Austrian embassy informed Vienna of the worsening of the situation in the Hungarian 
capital. In a dispatch, envoy Walter Peinsipp reported of an „open revolt of students and 
workers” and of the presence of „Russian troops with tanks in the city” (Rauchensteiner, 
1981: 5). This news came quite unexpectedly for the Austrian federal government, 
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because at that time Chancellor Julius Raab (ÖVP) and Foreign Minister Leopold Figl 
(ÖVP) were travelling abroad. The acting persons in Vienna were Interior Minister Oskar 
Helmer (SPÖ) and Defense Minister Ferdinand Graf (ÖVP). The situation in Hungary 
was assessed in a hasty meeting. It was necessary to initiate border security measures. For 
Helmer, the Hungarian demonstrations were a testament to the beginning of a 
democratization process. After all, just recently demonstrations by industrial workers 
took place in the industrial city of Poznań in Poland. Khrushchev's reckoning with Stalin's 
rule of terror aroused hopes for a democratic change in Moscow's satellite states. Helmer, 
however, deceived himself in his assessment of the events in Hungary. 
 On October 24 the Soviet Special Corps stationed in Hungary had once again been 
summoned to the Communist leadership’s assistance. Russian tanks were deployed in 
large Hungarian cities. At the same time, martial law was proclaimed. Raab saw himself 
as compelled by the situation to move quickly. In addition to reinforced patrols to secure 
the frontiers, with the support of the Bundesheereinheiten, restricted zones were 
established, which concerned almost the entire Burgenland. The implementation of these 
measures posed a major challenge, because the army did not have its own radio network, 
and military communication could only take place via the public telephone network. In 
addition, the equipment of the soldiers consisted of leftovers the US armed forces had left 
behind. 
On October 28, Foreign Minister Figl presented a diplomatic note from the 
Austrian Government to the Soviet Ambassador Sergei Lapin at the Vienna 
Ballhausplatz. In this, the government made it clear that the Austrian security forces 
would make use of their firearms if Soviet soldiers were to violate the frontier and would 
not comply promptly with a demand to drop their weapons. In addition, the government 
of the USSR was asked to end the military engagement to stop the bloodshed in Hungary. 
Vienna had demonstrated its determination, and also made it clear to Moscow that the 
Austrian federal government would not stand idly by if a violation of the borders should 
take place. After all in 1955 the Soviet Union, a signatory of the Austrian State Treaty, 
had itself demanded neutrality. The note of October 28, 1956 was therefore a logical 
consequence of the Treaty. 
The Austrian population had been informed about the events in Hungary via the 
media. The sympathies of the population were on the side of Hungarian freedom fighters. 
Hungarian emigrants organized demonstrations in Vienna and gathered in front of the 
Hungarian legation in order to demonstrate loudly against the violent actions of the Soviet 
P. WASSERTHEURER  COJOURN 1:3 (2016) 
soldiers. But why did this spontaneous demonstration of solidarity between the Austrian 
population and the freedom fighters occur? The myth of the heroic freedom fighter 
originated from the Austrian cultural situation of the post-war period. In 1956, the 
legendary Sissy films were produced and cultivated in public consciousness a revitalized 
Habsburg myth. „The Hungarian” was transfigured into a proud, heroic figure. He 
embodied a love for freedom, which many Austrians in 1956 in the fight of the insurgents 
believed to recognize. The Soviet soldier, whose action was still endowed with those 
negative clichés attributed to him by the Nazi regime in its propaganda, faced the 
Hungarian freedom fighter. Anti-Soviet feelings from the war and the occupation were 
still omnipresent in the collective consciousness of the Austrians in 1956. 
In the meantime, Budapest and Moscow began to organize a targeted media 
campaign against Austria through the Communist Party of Austria (KPÖ). Summarizing 
the newspaper reports in the Volkstimme, the central organ of Austria’s Communist Party, 
two accusations emerge. On the one hand, the Austrian government was accused of 
violating neutrality, and on the other hand it was asserted that Hungarian partisans were 
operating from Austria against Hungary, and delivered arms across the Austrian frontier 
to fellow insurgents. Soviet media talked of illegal American training camps for 
Hungarian counter-revolutionaries in Salzburg, Linz and Graz. Even the party organ of 
the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Rude Pravo, accused the Austrian government 
of violating neutrality by giving London, Washington, and Bonn the opportunity to equip 
Hungarian supporters of Horthy (Governor of Hungary, 1920-1944), former Fascist 
operatives, and militant followers of Szálasi (the Fascist leader of German-occupied 
Hungary from October 1944 to April 1945) with arms (Szentesi, 2006: 255). 
The first wave of refugees to Austria lasted from 23 October to 4 November 1956. 
During this short period, crossing the border from the Hungarian side was still possible 
without great obstacles. Since the registration of Hungarian refugees in Austria only 
started on 28 October 1956, no specific information can be given on the refugees in the 
days between 23 and 28 October. Many Hungarians of the first wave of refugees returned 
to their homeland. Friedrich Kern estimates the number of Hungarian refugees for 
October 1956 at 780 persons (Kern, 1959: 30). They were granted the right to asylum on 
the basis of the Haag (Hague) land warfare regulation of 1907, which includes the 
protection of civilians and refugees in case of land wars. The Hungarian refugees of the 
first hour were mostly accommodated in Vienna and Linz. The spontaneous humanitarian 
operations of the Austrian legation in Budapest are worth mentioning at this point. In an 
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initial support program, which lacked coordination, deliveries of the Austrian Red Cross 
(medication, blood supplies, food and clothing) were distributed to needy people, with 
the involvement of the legation’s staff. About 300 persons with dual citizenship could be 
transferred to Austria via the legation, which again found the Austrian side being accused 
of violating its neutrality. 
In the meantime, however, the struggle for power within the Communist 
leadership of Hungary had taken a dangerous turn. Prime Minister Imre Nagy demanded 
the immediate withdrawal of the Soviet troops and declared the departure of Hungary 
from the Warsaw Pact, whereby he proclaimed the neutrality of Hungary on the model of 
Austria, and on October 30 re-instated the multi-party parliamentary system in Hungary. 
At the same time, Nagy asked the United Nations (UN) to put the Hungarian question on 
the agenda. Moscow could not accept these demands, however, and continued the 
confrontational military intervention. The leadership in the Kremlin had to take into 
account the fact that other Communist countries would also follow the Hungarian 
example, which may have led to a collapse of the eastern military alliance. By October 
31, Khrushchev agreed to another intervention and installed from Moscow a compliant 
Hungarian counter-government headed by János Kádár. 
 
The great wave of refugees to Austria  
As the Soviet offensive started on 4 November with 150,000 men and 2,000 tanks, a 
strong defense by the Hungarians began, but they could not match the heavy artillery 
attacks by the Soviets. Within a few days, the revolution had ended, with 2,700 deaths. 
Immediately after the supression of the revolt, political cleansing was initiated all over 
the country, which caused an unexpectedly large wave of refugees. Soviet units had begun 
increasing the control of the border with Austria, but without hermetically sealing it. 
Already in the morning hours of 4 November 1956, a stream of refuges, with thousands 
of persons, started. The first settlements reached by the refugees on foot in icy 
temperatures of –20 degrees Celsius, were Pamhagen, Wallern, Tadten and Andau. 
Especially Andau played an important role for 70,000 refugees, as a small wooden bridge 
offered the last possible way to freedom. The American author James Michener wrote in 
his novel of the same name that this bridge was  
„... perhaps the most unimportant bridge in Europe. The fate of destiny alone meant 
that it became one of the most important bridges in the world for a few weeks.” 
(Michener, 1957: 244) 
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Even the later US President Richard Nixon came to Andau in 1956 in his role as Vice 
President of the United States to personally survey the situation of the refugees. The local 
chronicle of Andau noted in 1956, regarding the Austrian willingness to help:   
„The municipality of Andau and the population have in these days and weeks 
provided such large humanitarian services that could no longer be imagined today. 
The schools, the kindergarten, the movie theatre, and all public spaces served the 
accommodation of the refugees.” (See at http://andau-gemeinde.at/Bruecke-von-
Andau.21.0.html.)  
On November 21, 1956, the bridge of Andau was blown up by Soviet soldiers to cut 
refugees off from reaching freedom. In 1996, it was rebuilt as a symbol of Freedom, good 
neighborliness and the democratic resistance of 1956.  
The refugee camps in Eisenstadt, Wöllersdorf and Blumau were completely filled 
after a short time, which is why a first transport of 1,000 refugees rolled into Vienna by 
train. In a report of the Austrian Red Cross, the turbulent events of the time can be read:  
"On 4 November 1956 suddenly 5,000 refugees were at the Eisenstadt railway 
station. They had to be fed within a very short time. All the people were besieged 
and everywhere bread and sausage were bought up.” (See at 
http://www.roteskreuz.at/bgl/organisieren/wer-wir-sind/die-geschichte-des-rk-
burgenland/ungarnkrise-1956.) 
Large purchases by the Hungarians led initially to tensions with the local population, 
because they were now faced with empty shelves, but people brought food and clothing 
to designated places. However, the private aid organizations criticized the belated actions 
of official entities:  
"The Burgenland Red Cross alone maintained the Eisenstadt camp; only then did the 
state intervene and give money. Up until that point everything was financed and 
organized by the Red Cross." (Ibidem) 
On November 23 alone 8,500 Hungarians reached Austria in the span of a few hours. The 
Red Cross provided blood supplies, drugs, 5,800 tons of food, and 1,300 tons of clothing. 
CARE packages, which were brought to Austria via Italy, were distributed in the refugee 
camps. In the inner part of Vienna, places were set up for the collection of blood, and 
public buildings, galleries, museums and the Viennese Burgtheater were turned into 
collection centers for clothing and material donations from the population. In order to 
create more capacity for the care of the refugees, additional “internment” camps were set 
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up in Bruck a.d. Leitha, Feldbach, Oberwart and Klosterneuburg by the order of the 
Austrian Ministry of Defense. 
Helmer had to cocede that Austria was not able to provide heated accommodations 
in light of the flood of refugees. Even a train heated by a steam locomotive had to be used 
as emergency quarters. Later, barracks of the army were openend to offer heated rooms 
to refugee families with children. In Graz, Judenburg and Traiskirchen, the federal 
government set up three additional refugee camps.  At the end of November, Austria 
reached the limit of its reception capacity and appealed for help to the Western countries:  
“Our country has done what is humanly possible. It is now up to the Western 
countries and aid organizations to intervene quickly, since otherwise our own people 
will be exposed to the most serious economic and health hazards by the extensive 
granting of the right of asylum to the unfortunate Hungarian refugees." 
(Rauchensteiner, 1956: 87) 
There were refugee camps in a total of 86 communities in Burgenland, and outside of 
Burgenland another 61 communities hosted refugees by the end of November. Helmer 
had to admit that in view of the stream of refugees, Austria was not in a position to give 
all the refugees heated quarters. 
In the course of November and December Austria was caring for 165,000 
refugees. Only in early 1957, when Soviet troops secured the border using mines and the 
Hungarian government issued decrees placing the assisting of flight from the country 
under criminal penalty, did the situation calm.  In the following months, the stream of 
refugees ebbed substantially. Between October 1956 and June 1957, a total of 178,000 
Hungarian refugees were in Austrian care. When the revolution began, the Federal 
Government had expected a maximum of 10,000 refugees only.    
 
The Situation of the Hungarian Refugees in Austria 
The camps which were made available to the refugees were in terrible condition. The 
reception camp in Eisenstadt had been used by Soviet soldiers until 1956 and had not yet 
been reconditioned. Awaiting the refugees were leaky roofs and windows, insufficiently 
heated rooms and desolate sanitary equipment. Completely insufficient furnishings forced 
many to spend the nights on primitive straw bedding on the floor. In Traiskirchen too, the 
former Cadet School was altered in a makeshift way into an improvised reception camp. 
Life in the overfilled camps wore the people down.   
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Disappointment combined with helplessness, boredom, lack of orientation and 
fear for the future. The dissatisfaction regarding the conditions rose, as did the tensions 
between refugees and natives. In Salzburg, 100 refugees even started a hunger strike over 
the poor conditions of care and maintenance there. The Federal Government entrusted 
psychiatrists Hans Hoff and Hans Strotzka with scientific research into the psycho-
hygienical care of Hungarian refugees. Both experts came to the conclusion that refugees 
were only accepted by the native population with sympathy and willingness to help when 
they “behaved like poor, helpless children…When that is not the case, an almost regular 
pattern of aggression arises” (Hoff and Strotzka, 1958: 31). The Government tried to 
confront the collapse of the camps with concrete programs.  The refugees were given 
radios, Hungarian-language newspapers and magazines were offered to them. Cultural 
and sporting events, such as films, dance classes and soccer tournaments were organized 
as well. In addition, every refugee was supposed to consume at least 2400 calories per 
day.  However, the normalization of conditions in the camps and the rise in the standard 
of living there increased the aggression level of the native Austrian population, as 
described by Hoff and Strotzka. 
The daily newspaper, Die Presse, summarized the public mood as follows: “Those 
who are not in rags and reduced to skin and bone cannot really be in need.”2 
The Freedom Fighters of October 1956 were increasingly viewed as a social 
burden and a problem of International Law. Helmer attempted to calm the situation and 
declared that the refugees would only use Austria as a temporary refuge.  
 
Emigration from Austria 
In the last section of the paper, the question will be considered as to why only 18,000 
Hungarians, only a small percentage of the refugees, remained in Austria. The large 
majority of the refugees found a new homeland in other European countries or overseas.  
What motives caused the refugees back then to use Austria as a temporary haven and to 
move on? 
The lack of prospects for a future in Austria takes first place in this respect. The 
Austrian government held the view that Austria’s economy could only integrate 30,000 
refugees without burdening the labor market. The remaining 150,000 were recommended 
to quickly migrate.  The Provincial authorities were instructed to register those willing to 
                                                          
2 See at http://diepresse.com/home/zeitgeschichte/4753365/Fluchtlingskrise-1956_Menschlichkeit-mit-
Ablaufdatum. 
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emigrate and to process their exit applications and forward them to international refugee 
organizations. The largest of these organizations were the National Catholic Welfare 
Conference (NCWC), the Lutheran World Federation (WCC) and the Intergovernmental 
Committee for European Migration (ICEM).  By the end of January 1957, 70% of the 
refugees had already left Austria. In December 1956, the United States raised its entrance 
quota to 21,000 persons. According to the calculations of Friedrich Kern, European 
countries took in a total of 77,525 refugees, while the number going overseas was 82,330. 
(Murben, 2006: 358). 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, we will again look into the myth of the Austrian large-scale willingness to 
help at the time of the Hungarian uprising and its aftermath. Did Austria stand the 
humanitarian test with honor? Austrian historian Andreas Gémes adopts the thesis that 
Austria was completely unprepared for the Hungarian refugee wave, in his essay entitled 
“Deconstruction of a Myth?” (Gémes, 2009: 67).  On the basis of minutes of the Council 
of Ministers, Gémes was able to show that the initiatives taken by the Austrian Federal 
Government were less oriented towards integration than towards the fastest possible 
outmigration of the Hungarian refugees. Of course, such a critical analysis must be seen 
in the context of the Austrian situation of 1956. The withdrawal of the allied occupying 
powers had left the infrastructure in ruins, which was ill-suited to offer 180,000 refugees 
decent accommodation within a few weeks. In addition to this, in the period from 1945 
to 1954, Austria integrated around 360,000 ethnic German expellees. At the time of the 
Hungarian refugee crisis there were still numerous camps for these ethnic Germans which 
were funded and run by the federal government. (According to a report from the Austrian 
Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there were still 51 such federally-run camps in 1958.) 
On November 21, 1956, the Austrian Federal Government thus demanded faster action 
from the Western Community, and urged European quotas for re-settling refugees. 
In reality, not only had Austria misjudged the extent of the Hungarian refugee 
wave, but the whole of the West was surprised by it, and inadequately prepared. As in 
Austria, the infrastructures for the reception of Hungarian refugees had first to be created 
in other countries as well. Despite all legitimate criticism of Austria, the fact remains that 
Austria, under the most difficult of conditions, kept its borders open for the Hungarian 
refugees. It gave the refugees help in their flight, provided asylum to all refugees and, in 
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close cooperation with relief organizations and the population, freed up all resources 
possible to support them. 
On the other hand, the refugees could have contributed much more to the further 
economic development of Austria if the government had been more willing to integrate 
them. Two-thirds of the refugees were in the labor market. A quarter of them had higher 
levels of school and university education. Engineers, physicians, educators and senior 
administrative staff, according to the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, along with 
more than 1000 artists (actors, musicians, writers and journalists) and Hungarian 
university students were among those who escaped. According to a calculation by Ibolya 
Murber, about 4% of all the Hungarian scientists at that time were among the refugees 
who arrived in Austria (Murber, 2006: 81). 
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